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Evaluating the economic impact of an FTA is an important part of the monitoring and 
surveying process that should follow the establishment of an FTA. This paper presents 
methods for evaluating the trade and welfare effects of an FTA. These methods show 
how to (i) compute indicators for the utilization and value of preferences, (ii) qualitatively 
assess trade creation and diversion, (iii) quantitatively analyze the FTA‘s trade effects 
with trade indicators and the gravity model, and (iv) make inferences about economic 
welfare. This paper specifies the formulas, computational techniques, and data used for 
each evaluation method, and describes how to interpret the output from each method 
with examples taken from countries such as Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Cambodia. The 
strengths and limitations of each method are also discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: regionalization, evaluation methods, preferential tariffs, trade indicators, 
gravity model, free trade agreements, Asia 
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1.  Introduction 
 
After a free trade agreement (FTA) is established, it is important for policymakers to take 
stock of its effects. The actual impact of an FTA may be quite different from any prior 
projection. The purpose of this paper is to present ex post FTA evaluation methods to 
policymakers as it may not be clear what to assess or how to conduct a retrospective 
economic assessment. The focus of this paper is on the economic effects of preferences 
on trade because they are the core of any FTA. There are other aspects of regional 
integration,  such  as  the  financial,  political,  social,  and  technological  dimensions,  but 
these are beyond the scope of this paper.
1 The methods presented in this paper are 
mainly quantitative techniques to assess the trade and welfare outcomes of an FTA. 
These methods assume that there is enough data for statistical analysis from observing 
the FTA‘s effects. In general, the methods in this paper try to answer the following three 
questions: 
 
(i)  Has the FTA affected a member country‘s trade?  
(ii)  Have the FTA‘s trade effects raised a member country‘s welfare? 
(iii)  Through which channels has FTA-induced trade affected welfare? 
 
The methods are presented in three sections. The first section discusses various ways 
to  measure  the  extent  to  which  eligible  exporters  can  and  do  take  advantage  of 
preferences  under  an  FTA  by  showing  how  to  calculate  the  coverage,  utility,  and 
utilization rates. It also shows how to estimate the value of preferences to exporters and 
the cost of preferences to the countries that offer them. The second section explains 
how  to  use  trade  and  production  statistics  to  assess  the  trade  effects  and  welfare 
consequences of an FTA. It describes both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
evaluating an FTA. The third section contains a description of the gravity model, which is 
often applied to trade analysis. It discusses how to estimate the gravity model, provides 
sources for the required data, and explains how to interpret the estimation results. All the 
methods in this paper are accompanied by examples with real data from countries like 
Viet  Nam,  Indonesia,  and  Cambodia  that  illustrate  how  to  perform  the  necessary 
computations and derive conclusions.  
 
 
2.  FTA Preference Indicators 
 
The discriminatory nature of an FTA consists of granting preferential tariffs to fellow 
members of the agreement. The preferential tariff is lower than the most favored nation 
(MFN) tariff—the tariff imposed on imports from non-members. The difference between 
the MFN tariff and the preferential tariff is known as the preference margin. For example, 
for the HS 8-digit product Metal Office Furniture (94031000), Viet Nam‘s MFN tariff has 
been 32% since 2008, while the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) offered to 
countries in the Association of Southeast  Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is 5%. Therefore, the preference margin granted by Viet 
Nam on imports of this product from ASEAN partners is 27% (i.e., 32% - 5% = 27%).  
                                                 
1  Readers who are interested in the evaluation of non-economic aspects of regional integration may 




2.1   Coverage Rate 
 
The first step towards understanding the effects of FTA preferences is to calculate the 
coverage rate—the proportion of dutiable imports from FTA members that are eligible for 
preferential treatment. Dutiable imports are those imports on which the MFN tariffs are 
more  than  zero.  Imports  that  have  a  zero  MFN  duty  are  disregarded  because 
preferences would be irrelevant for them. To compute the coverage rate, one has to 
identify (i) all the tariff lines for which imports are dutiable, and (ii) all the dutiable tariff 
lines that are eligible for preferences. Let D be the set of all tariff lines with dutiable 
imports from FTA members and P be the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for 
preferences under the FTA. Note that P is a subset of D.













Rate Coverage  
where: 
 i is a tariff line 
Mi is the value of imports in the tariff line i from FTA members 
D is the set of all tariff lines with dutiable imports from FTA members 
P is the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA 
 
In the formula, the numerator is the sum of imports over all tariff lines that are both 
dutiable and eligible for preferences, while the denominator is the sum of imports over all 
dutiable tariff lines.
3 To calculate this fraction, one needs to know the import values from 
FTA partners for all dutiable tariff lines, and which dutiable tariff lines were eligible for 
preferences. 
 
The coverage rate shows the official scope of the FTA. The higher the ratio of dutiable 
imports eligible for preferences to total dutiable imports, the wider the scope of the FTA. 
The coverage rate does not show the actual utilization of preferences because some 
imports that were eligible for preferential treatment may have entered under the MFN 
regime for various reasons to be discussed below. Therefore, the coverage rate is an 
upper bound to the share of dutiable imports that actually entered with preferences. Note 
                                                 
2  Often, an FTA will state that a certain tariff line is eligible for preferences even though the tariff line has 
an MFN tariff of zero. This occurs when preferences are offered on broader categories of imports that 
include  both  dutiable  and  non-dutiable  tariff  lines.  In  any  case,  non-dutiable  tariff  lines  should  be 
excluded because preferential tariffs cannot be lower than zero. 
3  If it is known beforehand that most dutiable tariff lines have preference margins (i.e., only a few do not 














. That is, one minus the fraction of the sum of imports over all dutiable tariff lines 
that were not eligible for preferences over the sum of imports over all dutiable tariff lines. Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       3 
 
 
that the coverage rate can be computed for any combination of importers, exporters, 
products, and periods in the FTA. 
 
For example, consider the trade preferences granted by Viet Nam in 2008 to its ASEAN 
partners under AFTA. At the 8-digit level, out of 8,300 tariff lines, 8,099 were on the 
CEPT Included List. The other 201 products were listed under General Exceptions or 
were covered by another ASEAN scheme. Out of these 8,099 included products, 5,589 
were dutiable and therefore had MFN tariffs above zero. Of those, 5,137 dutiable tariff 
lines (92%) were eligible for preferences. The coverage rate was 86.5%.
4 It is worth 
reiterating that the coverage rate is an upper bound on the share of dutiable imports that 
actually utilized preferences, which may be far below the coverage rate if firms choose to 
ignore the FTA‘s preferential regime.     
 
Why  would  firms  ignore  preferences  granted  by  an  FTA?  To  benefit  from  these 
preferences, an exporting firm would have to deal with the administrative issues and 
technical requirements associated with an FTA‘s rules of origin. Rules of origin are the 
criteria  for  evaluating  whether  a  good  can  be  considered  to  have  originated  from  a 
country.
5 In an FTA or any preferential market access scheme, rules of origin are the 
basis for determining the eligibility of a good for preferences. Without rules of origin, an 
FTA would be prone to trade deflection, whereby goods enter into the free trade area via 
the  member  country  with  the  lowest  external  tariff  and  are  re-exported  to  another 
member country. Complying with rules of origin imposes various costs on firms. These 
costs stem from additional administrative fees and paperwork, accounting operations for 
extra information required by the certificate-granting authorities, and constraints on the 
sourcing of intermediate inputs in order to meet local content requirements.
6 These costs 
may be so large that they remove any incentive to utilize an FTA‘s preferential tariffs. For 
example, in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Anson et 
al.  (2005)  found  that  rules  of  origin  for  Mexican  exports  to  the  United  States  (US) 
imposed an average compliance cost of around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing 
the tariff preference (4% on average) on a large number of tariff lines. Studying the 
European  Union‘s  (EU)  preferential  market  access  schemes,  Nilsson  and  Matsson 
(2009) showed that the coverage rate was 37.3% of the EU‘s dutiable imports from the 
world,  but  the  share  of  dutiable  imports  that  actually  entered  with  preferences  was 
29.5%. Therefore, 7.8% of the EU‘s dutiable imports that were eligible for preferences 
did not utilize them.   
 
                                                 
4  This estimate is upwardly biased because trade data for Viet Nam is publicly available only at the 6-
digit level, and so tariff data had to be aggregated from the 8-digit to the 6-digit level.  It was assumed, 
in the aggregation process, that all FTA imports in a 6-digit tariff line would be considered eligible for 
preferences if at least one disaggregated tariff line at the 8-digit level was eligible for preferences.  This 
assumption  implies  a  much  larger  total  of  preferential  trade  and  therefore  an  overestimate  of  the 
coverage rate.   
5  Rules of origin are usually specified as a local content requirement (e.g., minimum percentage of local 
value added) or a substantial transformation requirement (e.g., change in tariff classification at the 
level of the tariff line or at the tariff heading). 
6  The theoretical costs of rules of origin have been studied by Krueger (1992), Krishna and Krueger 
(1995),  Falvey  and  Reed  (1998),  Falvey  and  Reed  (2002),  Krishna  (2005),  and  Duttagupta  and 
Panagariya (2007). 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
2.2  Utility Rate 
   
The utility rate measures the effective scope of the FTA as the share of dutiable imports 
that actually entered with preferences. The formula for the utility rate, as defined by 












Rate Utility  
where:  
i is a tariff line 
Mi is the value of imports in the tariff line i from FTA members 
U
i M is  the  value  of  imports  from  FTA  members  that  actually  utilized  the  FTA‘s 
preferential rate in the tariff line i 
D is the set of all tariff lines with dutiable imports from FTA members  
P is the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA 
 
In the formula, the numerator is the sum of all dutiable imports that actually utilized the 
FTA‘s preferences, while the denominator is the sum of imports over all dutiable tariff 
lines. The higher the utility rate, the larger the share of dutiable imports that actually 
entered under the preferential—rather than the MFN—tariff, indicating a wider effective 
scope of the FTA. Different from the coverage rate, the utility rate requires knowing the 
value of imports that actually entered with preferences within each dutiable tariff line that 
was eligible for preferential treatment.  
 
2.3   Utilization Rate 
 
Besides the scope of the FTA relative to dutiable imports, one may be interested in the 
attractiveness  of  a  preferential  regime  relative  to  MFN  treatment.  For  this,  we  can 
compute  the  utilization  rate,  which  shows  the  degree  to  which  preference-eligible 
dutiable imports enter under preferential—rather than MFN—tariffs.  The formula for the 













Rate n Utilizatio  
where:  
i is a tariff line 
Mi is the value of imports in the tariff line i from FTA members 
U
i M is  the  value  of  imports  from  FTA  members  that  actually  utilized  the  FTA‘s 
preferential rate in the tariff line i 
P is the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA 
 
In the formula, the numerator is the sum of all dutiable imports that actually utilized the 
FTA‘s preferences, while the denominator is the sum of all dutiable imports that were Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       5 
 
 
eligible for the FTA‘s preferences. The utilization rate differs from the utility rate in that 
the  denominator  of  the  former  considers  only  dutiable  imports  that  are  eligible  for 
preferences  while  that  of  the  latter  considers  all  dutiable  imports.  The  higher  the 
utilization  rate,  the  more  preference-eligible  imports  actually  enter  under  preferential 
rather than MFN tariffs. A higher utilization rate also implies that the compliance costs of 
rules of origin are less of a constraint. To provide a visual summary, Figure 1 below 
shows the structure of imports and the different components used in the calculation of 
the coverage, utility, and utilization rates. 
 
As  an  example,  we  consider  the  EU‘s  Generalized  System  of  Preferences  (GSP) 
scheme,  under  which  certain  ASEAN  countries  benefit  from  preferential  treatment. 
Preferential imports into the EU from ASEAN comprise mainly mechanical appliances, 
plastics and rubber, textiles, footwear, and prepared foodstuffs. Nilsson and Matsson 
(2009) compute a utilization rate of 65.3% for EU preferential imports from ASEAN in 
2007,  implying  that  34.7%  of  EU  preferential  imports  from  ASEAN  that  could  have 
entered under the GSP actually did not. The authors also calculate the utilization rate on 
EU preferential imports from the whole world, which is 79%. This is higher than the 
utilization rate on EU preferential imports from ASEAN. The authors explain ASEAN‘s 
lower utilization rate by showing that ASEAN countries face small ad valorem preference 
margins ranging from 0.8% (textiles) to 3.3% (prepared foodstuffs). Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the compliance costs of the EU‘s rules of origin for ASEAN countries to 
benefit  from  the  GSP  are  at  least  0.8%  –3.3%  of  import  value  for  each  of  the 
corresponding sectors.  
      
 
 






                 Dutiable Imports (A) 
(MFN > 0) 
Non-Dutiable Imports 
(MFN = 0) 
Dutiable Imports that actually utilized 
FTA preferences (C) 
             Dutiable Imports that are eligible for 
FTA preferences (B) 
(MFN tariff > FTA tariff) 
 
Coverage Rate = B/A*100 
Utility Rate = C/A*100 
Utilization Rate = C/B*100  
 
General 
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2.4   Value of FTA Preferences 
 
To exporters, the value of trade preferences comes from the rents generated by being 
subject to lower tariffs than the MFN tariff. For the importing country, these rents are an 
implicit  transfer  of  tariff  revenue  from  the  government  to  foreign  exporters—and, 
possibly, domestic importers—due to the preference scheme. The size of these rents 
are  proportional  to  the  preference  margin,  but  are  inversely  related  to  the  costs  of 
complying  with  rules  of  origin  and  the  market  power  of  domestic  importers  in  the 
industry. If the domestic importers of the product are able to affect the price by changing 
their  buying  patterns, then  they  may  be  able to  appropriate  some  of the  rents. This 
reduces the value of trade preferences to foreign exporters or, equivalently, the transfer 
from the importing country. For example, Özden and Olarreaga (2003) found that under 
the  African  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act  (AGOA),  a  preferential  scheme  for  African 
exports of clothing to the US, only 1/3 of the available rents actually accrued to African 
exporters. 
 
As a first step towards measuring the value of trade preferences, we can multiply the 
preference margin in a certain dutiable tariff line with the tariff line‘s value of imports from 
trade partners that are eligible for and actually use preferences. This yields a maximum 
value of preferences to foreign exporters because compliance costs and the effects of 
market power among domestic importers could reduce the actual value. Continuing with 
the example from the previous section, the maximum value of EU preferences to ASEAN 
exporters in 2007 for textiles was €14 million (= 0.8% * €1780.5 million). For prepared 
foodstuffs it was €30 million (= 3.3% * €905.9 million). For an aggregate measure of the 
maximum value of trade preferences, we can simply sum up the computed values over 
all dutiable tariff lines that were eligible for preferences. The aggregate maximum value 
of EU preferences to ASEAN exporters in 2007 was €546.8 million.
7 This number is the 
cost to the EU government of lost tariff revenue from offering preferences under the GSP 
to ASEAN exporters, but it is only an upper bound on and a rough approximation of the 
value of GSP preferences to ASEAN exporters. To obtain a more accurate figure of the 
value of trade preferences to foreign exporters, one has to estimate compliance costs 
and the effects of importer market power. Methods to do so are technically difficult, and 
the reader may refer to work by Herin (1986) and Anson et al. (2005) for the former, and 
Özden and Olarreaga (2009) for the latter.  
 
2.5   Data Sources: Customs Data and Firm Surveys 
 
The  main  sources  of  data  to  calculate  the  FTA  preference  indicators  described  in 
sections 2.1 to 2.4 are customs declarations and certificates of origin. For any good in a 
shipment, these documents should provide information on the value of the good, weight, 
HS code,  and the origin criterion used,  when  preferences are requested. The AFTA 
certificate of origin is known as Form D (an example of which is shown in this paper‘s 
Appendix), while, for the EU, information on the origin of goods is provided in the Single 
Administrative Document. If the relevant information for a specific FTA can be extracted 
                                                 
7  The raw numbers for the calculation of the aggregate value of EU preferences to ASEAN countries can 
be found in Tables 1 and 2 of Nilsson and Matsson (2009).  Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       7 
 
 
from these forms and compiled, then the indicators presented in the previous sections 
should be calculated to measure the utilization and value of preferences.
8 
 
Alternatively, the necessary information  for  a specific FTA  may be collected via firm 
surveys to estimate the indicators. The survey should be directed to a random sample of 
export firms from FTA member countries that  sell to other member countries,  and  it 
should include the following specific questions: 
 
(a) How much do you export to FTA member countries? 
(b) What percentage of your exports to FTA member countries is dutiable? 
(c) Out  of  your  dutiable  exports  to  FTA  member  countries,  what  percentage  is 
eligible for preferences? 
(d) Out of your dutiable exports to FTA member countries, what percentage actually 
enters under preferential tariffs?  
(e) For this FTA, what is the export-weighted average preferential tariff that you pay? 
(f)  Without this FTA, what would be the export-weighted average MFN tariff that you 
would pay?  
(g) As  a  percentage  of  the  value  of  your  exports  to  FTA  member  countries  that 
actually  enter  under  a  preferential  tariff,  what  is  the  administrative  and 
compliance cost? 
 
If  an  export  firm  provides  proper  responses  to  the  questions  above,  then  we  can 
compute the following statistics for the export firm: 
 
Utility rate = (d)  
Utilization rate = (d)/(c)  
Export-weighted average preference margin = (f) - (e)  
Value of exports that actually enter under preferential tariffs = (a)*(b)*(d) 
Maximum value of preferences for the export firm = (a)*(b)*(d)*[(f) - (e)] 
Maximum value of preferences net of administrative and compliance costs 
= (a)*(b)*(d)*[(f) - (e) - (g)] 
 
For either the utility or utilization rates, an export-weighted average of the export firms‘ 
rates can be used as an estimate of the aggregate rate. For an estimate of a country‘s 
aggregate  maximum  value  of  preferences,  we  sum  up  the  maximum  value  of 
preferences over all export firms in the sample and multiply this sum by the ratio of total 
intra-FTA exports over the sum of intra-FTA exports by firms in the sample.  
 
A firm-level survey may also be useful in collecting other information about export firms 
within an FTA.
9 More importantly, firm-level surveys can be used to investigate why the 
utilization rate of preferences in an FTA is high or low. The firms can be asked to rank 
                                                 
8  Statistics such as the number of certificates of origin issued or the number of companies that conduct 
international trade under an FTA may also be indicators of FTA preference utilization, but they are less 
accurate.  
9  For example, the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) conducts an annual survey directed 
at Japanese manufacturing firms‘ affiliates operating abroad that includes FTA-related questions on 
the percentage of exports sales out of total sales; the breakdown of export destinations; and whether 
or not the firm took advantage of FTAs and, if so, which ones. 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
the importance of certain factors in encouraging or discouraging preference utilization, 
such as availability of FTA-related information, size of preference margins, procedural 
efficiency  associated  with  rules  of  origin,  sourcing  constraints  under  rules  of  origin, 
overlapping  FTAs,  reduction  of  tariffs  under  investment  schemes,  and  nontariff 
measures. 
  
2.6   Strengths and Limitations of FTA Preference Indicators  
 
The indicators described in the previous sections are useful summary measures of the 
extent and effectiveness of preferences in an FTA. They are easily calculated provided 
that the relevant data is made available. However, these indicators do not identify the 
reasons for a given level of preference utilization. Firm-level surveys can be used to fill 
this gap. Furthermore, these indicators focus on measuring the scope, utilization, and 




3.  FTA Trade and Welfare Indicators  
 
This section explains how to use trade statistics to retrospectively analyze the trade 
effects of an FTA and make inferences about economic welfare. The trade impact of an 
FTA is of primary interest because the FTA is a commercial arrangement—therefore, 
intended  to  affect  trade—and  the  effects  on  trade  are  an  important  indicator  of  the 
welfare effects of the FTA. The first part of this section employs a qualitative Vinerian 
approach to analyzing the trade effects of an FTA in a particular sector. The second part 
presents two quantitative approaches that focus on trade indicators identified by Lloyd 
and  Maclaren  (2004).  The  methods  in  this  section  are  easy  to  implement  but  yield 
results that are only indicative of the trade effects of an FTA. As such, they are useful in 
gaining a first impression before more elaborate methods are deployed. A more formal 
method is described in section 4.    
 
3.1  Qualitative Analysis of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion  
 
Viner‘s (1950) analysis of FTAs provides a conceptual framework for studying the trade 
effects of an FTA. According to Viner‘s model, a regional trading agreement is beneficial 
(harmful) if the magnitude of trade creation—when preferential tariffs replace inefficient 
home production by efficient imports from an FTA partner—is larger (smaller) than trade 
diversion—when preferential tariffs replace efficient imports from the rest of the world 
by inefficient imports from an FTA partner. Therefore, it is important to focus on changes 
in domestic production and intra- and extra-regional trade. 
 
For a qualitative evaluation of an FTA‘s trade effects, one can make a comparison of 
trade and production levels before and after an FTA‘s implementation using the following 
criteria: 
 
(i)  an increase in imports from FTA partners accompanied by a drop in domestic 
production indicates trade creation; Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       9 
 
 
(ii)  an increase in imports from FTA partners accompanied by a drop in imports from 
non-FTA partners indicates trade diversion 
(iii) a  rise  in  total  imports  where  imports  from  non-FTA  partners  are  constant  or 
increasing  implies  that  there  is  no  trade  diversion,  thus  indicating  a  positive 
welfare effect; 
(iv) a  rise  in  total  imports  where  imports  from  non-FTA  partners  and  domestic 
production decrease and 
(a) the fall in imports from non-FTA partners is larger than the fall in domestic 
production,  implying  that  trade  diversion  exceeds  trade  creation,  thus 
indicating a negative welfare effect; or 
(b) the  fall  in  imports  from  non-FTA  partners  is  smaller  than  the  fall  in 
domestic production, implying that trade creation exceeds trade diversion, 
thus indicating a positive welfare effect; and 




Figure 2: Indonesian Food Manufacturing (ISIC 311, rev. 2)—Value-Added and 




      Source: World Bank‘s Trade, Production, and Protection Database (Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). 
 
 
To illustrate, consider Indonesia‘s food manufacturing sector (ISIC 311, Rev.2). Figure 2 
shows the sector‘s trends from 1987 to 1996 in domestic value-added, total imports, 
imports from ASEAN, and imports from non-ASEAN countries.  Since the original six 
                                                 
10  A drop in total imports may be the result of a (i) fall in imports from both FTA and non-FTA partners, 
(ii) larger fall in imports from non-FTA partners relative to an increase in imports from FTA partners, 
and  (iii)  larger  fall  in  imports  from  FTA  partners  relative  to  an  increase  in  imports  from  non-FTA 
partners. In cases (i) and (ii), there is no trade creation and, therefore, the welfare effect is negative. 
Case (iii) is unlikely because the FTA is supposed to discriminate in favor of FTA partners and against 
non-FTA partners.    10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
ASEAN countries signed AFTA in January 1992, the reference year chosen was 1991. 
After 1991, ASEAN imports were relatively stable, except for upward spikes in 1993 and 
1996. Non-ASEAN imports after 1991 followed an increasing trend except for a sharp fall 
in  1993.  Therefore,  1993  and  1996  stand  out  as  years  when  the  preferential 
arrangements in AFTA may have affected Indonesian imports in this sector. In 1993—a 
year of possible trade diversion—the increase in ASEAN imports was accompanied by a 
large fall  in  non-ASEAN  imports. The  increase  in  intra-regional  imports  in  1993  was 
smaller than the drop in extra-regional imports as shown by the dip in total imports. As 
such, it is likely that this sector experienced a negative welfare effect in 1993. Further, it 
is  unlikely  that  intra-regional  imports  were  replacing  domestic  production  (i.e.,  trade 
creation) because domestic production reached a peak in 1993. In contrast, 1996 was a 
year when ASEAN imports increased and non-ASEAN imports had reached a level that 
was four times that of 1991. The rise in non-ASEAN imports in 1996 suggests that there 
was  no  trade  diversion  and,  therefore,  Indonesia‘s  food  manufacturing  sector  was 
experiencing a positive welfare effect. 
 
Although this type of pre-post analysis is relatively easy, there are several limitations to 
this method. First, the analysis is descriptive and does not quantify the FTA‘s trade or 
welfare effects. Having these effects quantified is a pre-requisite for combining results 
with those from other sectors and conducting a cost-benefit analysis of an FTA. Second, 
the analysis assumes that any changes in trade and production are caused by the FTA 
when  these  could  be  affected  by  other  factors  such  as  changes  in  import  demand, 
supply of the import substitute, or technological advances. Not accounting for these non-
FTA factors provides a misleading impression of how the FTA affects trade and welfare. 
In other words, assuming that trade and production would remain at their pre-FTA levels 
in the absence of the FTA—and, therefore, that all changes in trade and production are 
caused by the FTA—is unrealistic.   
 
3.2   Quantitative Indicators of Trade and Welfare Effects 
 
One problem with the previous method is that neither the FTA‘s trade nor welfare effects 
are quantified, leaving the magnitudes of these effects unknown.  To compute these 
effects,  we  refer  to  the  general  equilibrium  model  of  a  regional  trading  arrangement 
devised  by  Lloyd  and  Maclaren  (2004).  They  show  that  the  economic  welfare  of  a 
member country depends on changes in three key indicators: (i) trade volume, (ii) intra-
union terms of trade, and (iii) extra-union terms of trade. These are all positively related 
to the member country‘s welfare, meaning that if, for example, a member country‘s trade 
volumes increase or its terms of trade improve as a result of the FTA, then its economic 
welfare will have risen. 
 
3.2.1   Trade Volumes and Terms of Trade: Observed Values 
 
This section shows how to use observed trade values to compute changes in trade 
volume, terms of trade, and welfare according to the model developed by Lloyd and 
Maclaren (2004). The example used here is trade in Indonesia‘s food manufacturing 
sector  (ISIC  311,  Rev.2)  in  the  years  1991  and  1995  with  four  trading  partners—
Thailand, Singapore, Australia, and Canada—that comprise two ASEAN and two non-
ASEAN countries. Although Indonesia traded manufactured food with other countries, Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       11 
 
 
we will assume for illustrative purposes that the four countries above were Indonesia‘s 
only trade partners in manufactured food. 
 
 
Table 1: Indonesian Trade Values, Quantities, and Unit Values in ISIC 311, 
Rev. 2 with Selected ASEAN and Non-ASEAN Countries, 1991 and 1995 
 























Indonesia  Thailand   1991   103,377  292,900  0.35  3,361  10,094  0.33 
Indonesia  Thailand   1995  388,923  1,118,000  0.35  10,411  13,149  0.79 
Indonesia  Singapore  1991  41,991  132,600  0.32  45,701  108,100  0.42 
Indonesia  Singapore  1995  48,269  66,139  0.73  38,576  36,742  1.05 
Indonesia  Australia   1991  44,781  52,198  0.86  20,587  47,371  0.43 
Indonesia  Australia   1995  107,103  138,200  0.77  23,602  29,646  0.80 
Indonesia  Canada   1991  9,853  53,552  0.18  13,167  32,063  0.41 
Indonesia  Canada   1995  18,459  54,609  0.34  23,491  33,254  0.71 
 
Note: The unit value is the trade value divided by the trade quantity. 
Source: Author‘s computations with data sourced from the World Bank‘s Trade, Production, and Protection Database 
(Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). 
 
 
Table  1  shows  trade  data  for  computing  changes  in  Indonesia‘s  manufactured  food 
trade volumes and terms of trade between 1991 and 1995, which is 3 years after the 
ASEAN  Free  Trade  Agreement  was  signed  by  the  original  six  members  in  1992. 
According to Lloyd and Maclaren‘s model, the sum of bilateral changes in trade volumes 
should be weighted by any border taxes or subsidies in a base period.
11 We use 1991 
as the base period and 1995 as the new period in our example. We assume that there 
are  no  border  measures  on  exports,  so  the  trade  volume  computation  only  involves 
imports. We obtain data on applied import tariffs from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade  and  Development‘s  (UNCTAD)  TRAINS  database  via  World  Integrated  Trade 
Solution (WITS) software. Indonesia‘s import-weighted applied tariffs in 1990 classified 
under ISIC 311, Rev. 2 in 1990 were 12.55% (Singapore), 14.95% (Thailand), 17.85% 
(Australia),  and  2.96%  (Canada).
12  We  weight  the  import  volume  changes  with  the 
                                                 
11  A tax or subsidy on a traded good in their model simply shows up as the difference between the 
international  and  domestic  prices  of  a  good.  For  example,  an  import  tariff  on  a  good  causes  the 
domestic price to be higher than the international price by the amount of the tariff. As another example, 
an export subsidy on a good also causes the domestic price to be higher than the international price by 
the amount of the subsidy.  
12  There are many HS six-digit categories that fall under ISIC 311, Rev.2. WITS provides import and tariff 
data by HS six-digit categories. Let HS be the set of HS six-digit categories that correspond to ISIC 
311, Rev. 2 imports from a partner country and m be a particular HS six-digit category within that set.  12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
product of these ad valorem import-weighted tariffs and the corresponding unit values in 
the base period. The change in trade volume is therefore calculated as such: 
 
    
p
p p mp mp m m u t Volume Trade in Change
0 1 0  
where: 
 the p subscript indicates a partner country 
 tmp is the import-weighted ad valorem tariff on imports from partner country p in the base 
period  
0
mp u is  the  unit  value  of  imports  from  partner  country  p  in  the  base  period 
1
p m  is the quantity of imports from partner country p in the new period 
0
p m  is the quantity of imports from partner country p in the base period  
 
In the example of Indonesian manufactured food imports between 1991 and 1995, the 
change in trade volume was US$53,423,000. This is positive, indicating that economic 
welfare in this sector rose in part because of expanded trade volumes. 
   
To  complete  the  analysis,  we  compute  changes  in  Indonesia‘s  terms  of  trade  with 
respect  to  ASEAN  and  non-ASEAN  partners  in  the  sector  for  manufactured  food. 
According  to  Lloyd  and  Maclaren‘s  model,  the  change  in  terms  of  trade  should  be 
weighted by base period trade quantities. The change in terms of trade is therefore 
calculated as such: 
 




xp xp p u u m u u x Trade of Terms in Change
0 1 0 0 1 0  
where: 
 the p subscript indicates a partner country 
0
p x  is the quantity of exports to partner country p in the base period 
1
xp u is the unit value of exports to partner country p in the new period 
0
xp u is the unit value of exports to partner country p in the base period  
0
p m  is the quantity of imports from partner country p in the base period 
1
mp u is the unit value of imports from partner country p in the new period  
0
mp u is the unit value of imports from partner country p in the base period 
 
                                                                                                                                            



















t , where Mm is the 
value of base period imports from the partner country in category  m and tm is the base period ad 
valorem applied tariff on imports from the partner country in category m. As information on Indonesia‘s 
import measures for 1991 was unavailable, we assume that the import-weighted tariffs in 1991 were 
the same as in 1990. Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       13 
 
 
The formula is applied to two groups: intra-bloc and extra-bloc partners. In the example, 
the change in Indonesia‘s terms of trade for manufactured food with respect to ASEAN 
countries  is  US$18,380,000,  and  for  non-ASEAN  countries  it  is  US$23,275,650. We 
conclude  that  three  years  after  AFTA,  Indonesia‘s  food  manufacturing  sector 
experienced a gain in economic welfare through increased trade volumes and improved 
terms of trade with respect to both ASEAN and non-ASEAN partners. The overall gain in 
welfare was approximately US$95.1 million (i.e., 53.4 + 18.4 + 23.3). 
 
The analysis above was able to quantify the trade and welfare effects of an FTA in a 
particular sector. The same analysis could be repeated over multiple sectors and the 
results aggregated to obtain more wide-ranging results. However, like the method in 
section 3.1, the approach above did not address the problem of whether or not these 
effects  were  actually  caused  by  the  FTA.  Both  methods  implicitly  assumed  that  the 
changes in trade and production after the FTA were driven solely by the FTA. If other 
factors besides the FTA were significant in affecting trade and production patterns, then 
these two methods would be inappropriate. 
  
3.2.2   Trade Volumes and Terms of Trade: Extrapolated Values with Pre-
FTA Growth Rates  
 
In  order  to  isolate  the  effects  of  the  FTA  from  the  effects  of  other  factors  such  as 
changes in income, prices, transportation and communication costs, it is necessary to 
construct a counterfactual, which is a hypothetical estimate of what trade would have 
been without the FTA. The FTA‘s trade effects can then be quantitatively assessed by 
comparing actual values with the counterfactual. This section constructs a simple but 
imperfect counterfactual that allows trade in the post-FTA period to evolve according to 
pre-FTA trends. The underlying assumption is that the impact of other factors besides 
the FTA on the trend in trade flows would be the same with or without the FTA. More 
specifically, we compute the geometric mean of annual growth in the pre-FTA period and 
use this growth rate to obtain numeric estimates of the counterfactual after integration. 
 
 
Table 2: Indonesian Geometric Mean Annual Growth Rates of Trade Quantities 
and Unit Values in ISIC 311, Rev. 2 with Selected ASEAN and Non-ASEAN 
Countries, 1987–1991 (%) 
 








Singapore  32.36     –5.50      2.88    17.66 
Thailand   65.83     –4.70  118.40  –25.07 
Australia   22.19       2.03  144.11  –10.12 
Canada   –8.10  –12.80  101.51    –8.34 
 













, where gt is 
the annual growth rate of imports in year t. We use the geometric and not the arithmetic mean because the latter 
would overestimate the variables in the post-FTA period. 
Source: Author‘s computations with data sourced from the World Bank‘s Trade, Production, and Protection Database 
(Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). 14          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
We continue using the case of Indonesian trade in food manufacturing (ISIC 311, rev. 2) 
with Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and Canada from 1987–1995. As noted previously, 
AFTA was signed in 1992 and, therefore, import growth rates for Indonesia prior to 1992 
are needed in order to estimate a counterfactual for the years 1992 onwards. The pre-
AFTA (1987–1991) geometric mean annual growth rates of Indonesia‘s import quantities 
and trade unit values with the four selected partners are shown above in Table 2.  
 
Table 3: Indonesian Actual and Extrapolated Trade Statistics with Selected 
ASEAN and Non-ASEAN Countries, 1991–1995 
 
  Partner Country   Singapore  Thailand  Australia  Canada 




Actual (‗000 kilos)   132,600  66,139 292,900  1,118,000  52,198 138,200 53,552 546,109 
Ext. (‗000 kilos)   n.a.  407,013  n.a.  2,215,011  n.a.  116,348  n.a.  38,250 
Imputed AFTA  
Effect (‗000 kilos) 
 




Actual (US$ per kilo)  0.32  0.73  0.35  0.35  0.86  0.77  0.18  0.34 
Ext. (US$ per kilo)   n.a.  0.33  n.a.  0.29  n.a.  0.93  n.a.  0.10 
Imputed AFTA Effect 
(US$ per kilo)  
 




Actual (‗000 kilos)   108,100  36,742  10,094  13,149  47,371  29,646 32,063  33,254 
Ext.( ‗ 000 kilos)   n.a.  1,682,114  n.a.  528,691  n.a.  121,113  n.a.  229,663 
Imputed AFTA Effect 





















Actual (US$ per kilo)  0.42  1.05  0.33  0.79  0.43  0.80  0.41  0.71 
Ext. (US$ per kilo)   n.a.  0.78  n.a.  0.16  n.a.  0.28  n.a.  0.29 
Imputed AFTA Effect 
(US$ per   kilo)  
n.a.  0.27  n.a.  0.63  n.a.  0.51  n.a.  0.42 
 
Ext.= extrapolated, n.a. = not applicable. 
Source: Author‘s computations with data sourced from the World Bank‘s Trade, Production, and Protection Database 
(Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). 
 
To  illustrate  the  extrapolation,  consider  Indonesia‘s  trade  with  Singapore  in  1991: 
Indonesia imported 132.6 million kilograms of manufactured food from Singapore at a 
unit  value  of  US$0.32 per kilogram. To  extrapolate  Indonesia‘s  import  quantities, for 
example,  from  1991  to  1995,  the  1991  import  quantity  is  simply  multiplied  by  the 
corresponding geometric mean growth rate over 4 years: 132.6 million * (1 + 32.36%)
4 = 
407  million  kilograms.  The  difference  between  the  actual  and  extrapolated  values of 
each variable is an estimate of the AFTA effect. Table 3 shows the calculations of the 
imputed AFTA effect on Indonesian manufactured food imports. We can see that this 
effect was negative in 1995 for Indonesia‘s two ASEAN partners and positive for the two 
non-ASEAN  partners.  This  is  surprising  as  the  preferential  agreement  should  have 
increased Indonesia‘s intra-regional imports and reduced extra-regional imports.  Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       15 
 
 
However,  to  quantify  the  trade  volume  effect  on  welfare,  we  use  a  slightly  adapted 
version of the Lloyd and Maclaren (2004) measure as described in the previous section. 
The change in trade volume is now calculated as such: 
 





mp mp m m u t Volume Trade in Change
1  
where:  
the p subscript indicates a partner country 
 tmp is the import-weighted ad valorem tariff on imports from partner country p in the base 
period 
E
mp u is the extrapolated unit value of imports from partner country p in the new period 
1
p m  is the actual quantity of imports from partner country p in the new period 
E
p m  is the extrapolated quantity of imports from partner country p in the new period
13  
 
In this example, the change in trade volume is –US$57,745,000. This negative amount 
partially indicates that AFTA had a negative welfare impact on the food manufacturing 
sector in Indonesia because of lower trade volumes.  
 
Table 3 also shows that, as a result of AFTA, Indonesia‘s manufactured food import 
prices  from  Singapore,  Thailand,  and  Canada  increased,  while  imported  food  from 
Australia became cheaper. Indonesia‘s manufactured food export prices to all these four 
countries rose. To quantify the terms-of-trade effect, we can compute another adapted 
Lloyd and Maclaren welfare measure. The change in terms of trade is now calculated as 
such: 
 










p u u m u u x Trade of Terms in Change
1 1  
where: 
 the p subscript indicates a partner country  
E
p x  is the extrapolated quantity of exports to partner country p in the new period 
1
xp u is the unit value of exports to partner country p in the new period 
E
xp u is the extrapolated unit value of exports to partner country p in the new period 
E
p m  is the extrapolated quantity of imports from partner country p in the new period 
1
mp u is the unit value of imports from partner country p in the new period  
E
mp u is the extrapolated unit value of imports from partner country p in the new period 
 
For the Indonesian food manufacturing sector, the change in terms of trade in relation to 
its two ASEAN partners was –US$113,145,580, which indicates a loss. On the other 
hand, Indonesia experienced a positive change in its terms of trade vis-à-vis its two non-
                                                 
13  Import-weighted tariffs were used in the base period because these correspond to the tariff regime 
without the FTA. In this example, the same import-weighted applied tariffs were used as in Section 
3.2.1.  16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
ASEAN partners in the amount of US$1,094,173,160. The combined welfare effects of 
changes in trade volume and terms of trade are overwhelmingly positive at  US$923 
million  (i.e.,  1094  –113  –  58),  with  most  of  the  gains  coming  from  improved  extra-
regional terms of trade.  
 
To complete the analysis, an explanation is required for the surprising result above that 
AFTA reduced Indonesia‘s intra-regional imports. This may be due to several factors that 
created an upward bias in the estimated counterfactual trend. Firstly, there was already 
some growth in Indonesian manufactured food imports from ASEAN before 1992 as 
economic  restructuring  took  place  in  anticipation  of  AFTA.  Secondly,  Indonesia 
introduced rapid, large-scale economic reforms in the latter half of the 1980s, especially 
in the trade and finance sectors, and these reforms would have had the most impact on 
trade and production before 1992. Thirdly, the effects of preferences were not seen in 
the first half of the 1990s because Indonesia took a longer time to implement its AFTA 
commitments. These three factors may have contributed to an overestimation of the 
counterfactual trend and, therefore, generated extrapolated values that were larger than 
actual values.  
 
3.3   Strengths and Limitations of FTA Trade and Welfare Indicators  
 
The main strengths of the set of indicators described above is that they can offer a quick 
first impression of an FTA‘s effects on trade and welfare at any level—tariff line, sectoral, 
national,  or  regional—provided  that  the  requisite  data  is  available.  The  qualitative 
Vinerian method is limited, however, by its descriptive nature. To measure the size of an 
FTA‘s  trade  and  welfare  effects,  one  can  use  the  quantitative  methods  explained  in 
sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. These methods are relatively simple to compute with data on 
trade and tariffs, and are based on a sound general-equilibrium model. However, these 
quantitative methods are limited in the way that they account for other factors, besides 
the FTA, that affect trade. The method in section 3.2.1 does not use a counterfactual 
and assumes that observed changes in trade after the FTA are entirely due to the FTA. 
Section  3.2.2  details  a  method  that  uses  a  counterfactual  based  simply  on  pre-FTA 
growth  rates  in  trade.  This  counterfactual  captures  the  general  trends  in  trade  and 
welfare and—to some extent—how other factors besides the FTA affect these general 
trends. However, this counterfactual obviously does not account for the variation in trade 
and welfare levels caused by individual non-FTA factors. These methods, therefore, may 
not provide reliable estimates of an FTA‘s trade and welfare impact. For more credible 
estimates, more elaborate methods, like the formal method described in section 4, need 
to be deployed.  
 
 
4.  The Gravity Model  
 
This section describes an econometric method of estimating trade flows known as the 
gravity model.
14 This model has been used to analyze the impact of not only FTAs, but 
                                                 
14  The gravity model is attributed to Jan Tinbergen (1962), who compared the size of bilateral trade flows 
between any two countries to the gravitational force in physics between two objects. Since Tinbergen, Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       17 
 
 
also the effects of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade–World Trade Organization 
(GATT–WTO) membership, currency unions, migration flows, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and even disasters. The main benefit of the gravity model in evaluating an FTA is 
that it can control for the effects of as many other trade determinants besides the FTA as 
necessary  and,  therefore,  isolate  the  effects  of  the  FTA  on  trade.  The  basic  gravity 
model of trade, which is analogous to Newton‘s Law of Universal Gravitation in physics, 
relates  the  imports  of  country  i  from  country  j  (Mij)  positively  to  the  gross  domestic 
product (GDP) of the importing country (Yi) and the GDP of the exporting country (Yj), but 







G M             (1) 
 
where G is a constant. Expressed in logarithmic form and attaching a random error term 
(uij), the basic gravity equation becomes  
 
ij ij j i ij u D Y Y G M      ln ln ln ln 3 2 1         (2) 
 
where the   ‘s are coefficients. Given the hypothesized relationships contained in the 
gravity model,  1    and  2    are expected  to be positive,  while  3    is expected  to be 
negative.  In  the  gravity  equation,  geographical  distance  between  the  importing  and 
exporting  countries  is  actually  a  proxy  for  trade  costs,  which  impede  bilateral  trade. 
Other variables that capture trade costs (e.g., adjacency, common language, colonial 
links, common currency, or whether the importing or exporting countries are islands or 
landlocked) may be added to this basic equation along with other explanatory variables. 
Furthermore,  recent  theoretical  work  on  the  gravity  equation  has  emphasized  that 
bilateral trade is not only a function of distance between the two countries, but also the 
distance of the pair from other countries. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) have coined the 
term ―multilateral trade resistance‖ to denote the distance between the pair vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world: the higher the multilateral resistance, the more the pair of countries 
should  trade  with  each  other  and  vice-versa.  Multilateral  resistance  can  be  easily 
included in the basic gravity equation as a set of fixed importer (MTRi) and exporter 
effects (MTRj).
15 The gravity equation is thus 
 
                                                                                                                                            
many  authors  have  produced  theoretical  models  that  yield  the  gravity  equation  for  trade  (e.g., 
Anderson 1979 and Bergstrand 1985). . 
15  Here, a fixed effect is a binary variable that indicates whether or not an observation is of an individual 
country. For example, to construct a fixed importer effect for Cambodia, we set a variable equal to one 
whenever  the  importing  country  is  Cambodia  and  zero  otherwise.  When  these  fixed  effects  are 
included, it is not possible to estimate the effects of time-invariant country specific characteristics such 
as being an island, or being landlocked. Instead of using fixed effects to control for multilateral trade 
resistance, one could use a formula that measures the average distance to other trading partners or 
use iterative methods to construct estimates of the price-raising effects of barriers to multilateral trade 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).  18          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
   ij ij j i ij u D Y Y G M        j i MTR MTR ln ln ln ln 3 2 1        (3)  
 
At a minimum, the model is estimated with data on bilateral trade, GDP, and distance, 
using linear regression (ordinary least squares), which is a procedure performed by any 
statistical software package.
16 The sample should not be restricted only to countries in 
which the researcher is interested, but it should include as many countries as possible 
so  that  the  regression  is  based  on  the  maximum  information  available.  The  gravity 
equation can be estimated with data across pairs of countries from just one year (cross 
section) or for pairs of countries observed over multiple years (panel data). The latter is 
preferable because, then, the effects of particular years on global trade can be controlled 









ij u D Y Y G M         YEARS MTR MTR j i ln ln ln ln 3 2 1           (4) 
 
where the  t  superscript denotes the year of the observation and  YEARS  is a set  of 
indicator variables for all the years in the sample except the first.
17   
 
For the analysis of an FTA, we add two variables to the gravity equation. The first is an 
indicator variable (TradeCreate) for observations where both the importing and exporting 
countries are members of the FTA in year t, while the second is an indicator variable 
(TradeDivert) for observations where the importing country is a member of the FTA in 
year t, but the exporting country is not. As the variable names suggest, the first variable 
measures  trade  creation,  which  is  expected  to  be  positive  under  the  FTA,  and  the 
second, trade diversion, which is expected to be negative under the FTA. The gravity 












t TradeDiver e TradeCreat D Y Y G M
  
      
YEARS MTR MTR j i
ln ln ln ln 3 2 1   
           (5) 
 
 
4.1   Gravity Model Data 
 
Estimation of a gravity equation requires data on bilateral trade, GDP, distances, and 
possibly  other  determinants  of  bilateral  trade  including  contiguity  (common  border), 
common language, colonial ties, and exchange rates. Bilateral trade flows can be found 
in  the  International  Monetary  Funds‘  (IMF)  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics;  the  UN‘s 
COMTRADE database; or the World Bank's Trade, Production, and Protection database 
by  Nicita  and  Olarreaga  (2006).    GDP  in  current  US  dollars,  converted  at  current 
exchange rates, can be found in the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics or the World 
Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on distances—typically the geodesic 
                                                 
16  Some examples of statistical software are Stata, SAS, and E-Views. Linear regression is also available 
in the Data Analysis Tool of Excel. 
17  Suppose the sample contains observations from 2000 to 2003, then the YEARS set includes indicator 
variables for 2001, 2002, and 2003. The 2001 indicator variable, for example, is equal to 1 when the 
observation is from that year, and zero otherwise. Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements  |       19 
 
 
distances  between  capitals  or  the  largest  cities  of  each  country  by  population—are 
available  from  the  Centre  d'Etudes  Prospectives  et  d'Informations  Internationales 
(CEPII), along with other geographic and trade-related variables.
18 
 
4.2   Interpretation of Gravity Model Results 
 
To illustrate, a gravity model was estimated with data from 177 importing countries and 
193  exporting  countries  over  the  period  1988–2007.  The  trade  data  is  sourced  from 
COMTRADE, GDP from the WDI, and the distance variable from CEPII. The gravity 
model is estimated first without any FTA-related variables as in equation (4), and then 
with FTA-related variables as in equation (5). The trade effects of AFTA are evaluated 
next. AFTA, as mentioned in previous sections, was signed by the original six members 
in  1992  and  joined  subsequently  by  Viet  Nam  in  1995,  Lao  People‘s  Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR) and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.  
 
 
Table 4: Regression Results from Gravity Model Estimation 
 
 
Linear regression                                                  
Number of obs 
F(382,259736) 
Prob > F   
R-squared  
Root MSE               
=  260119 
=  2271.82 
=  0.0000 
=  0.7312 
=  2.0943 
  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  t  P>| t |  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  .8561031     .0259124      33.04     0.000       .8053155      .9068908 
  .3612175     .0233257      15.49     0.000       .3154998      .4069352 
  -1.691341     .0058937    -286.98     0.000       -1.702892      -1.67979 
 
 
Table 4 shows output from having used the Stata software package to estimate the 
gravity model as formulated in equation (4).  Only the results for GDP and distance are 
shown as these are the key explanatory variables in the gravity model. The coefficient 
estimates, since the variables are in logarithmic form, can be interpreted as elasticities. 
For example, the coefficient estimate on the importing country‘s GDP is equal to 0.865, 
which implies that a 1.0% increase in the GDP of the importing country raises its imports 
by 0.865%.  
 
The  coefficient  estimates  and  their  standard  errors  can  be  used  to  test  certain 
hypothesized  relationships.  For  example,  suppose  we  state  a  null  hypothesis  that 
bilateral trade is unrelated to the GDP of the importing country ( 1   equals zero). The 
regression results show that the coefficient estimate on the importing country‘s GDP 
(
1 ˆ  ) is 0.865 with a standard error of 0.026. To test the stated null hypothesis, we first 
choose  a  level  of  statistical  significance—the  maximum  probability  that  the  null 
                                                  
18




lnMij20          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 59  
 
 
hypothesis can be mistakenly rejected. This level is often set at 5% (or 1% for a more 








1    
 

statistic t  
 
 
This  t-statistic  is  computed  automatically  by  most  regression  software  packages, 
including Stata as shown in Table 4. Once the value for the t-statistic is determined, it 
can  be  compared  to  the  critical  value,  which  is  a  cutoff  value  for  the  t-statistic 
corresponding to the chosen significance level. The critical value can be found using a 
table of values from Student's t-distribution. To consult this table, we need to compute 
the degrees of freedom, which is the number of observations (n) minus the number of 
explanatory  variables  (k)  minus  1  (n-k-1),  or  in  this  example:  260,119  –  382  –  1  = 
259,736. This example contains a large number of explanatory variables because of the 
importer and exporter fixed effects as well as the year indicator variables. The critical 
value for this test with a significance level of 5% is 1.96.
19 As the computed t-statistic is 
more than the  critical  value,  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected. Therefore,  a  statistically 
significant relationship exists between bilateral trade and the importing country‘s GDP. 
Most statistical software packages also produce a p-value, which is the probability of 
finding,  due  to  random  sampling,  as  large  a  difference  between  the  estimated  and 
hypothesized values as the difference actually found given that the hypothesized value 
is true. A smaller p-value implies a smaller probability that random sampling caused as 
large a difference between the estimated and hypothesized values to be found, therefore 
a higher likelihood that the values are indeed different, and a firmer basis to reject the 
null hypothesis. An alternative method of hypothesis testing that yields the same result 
as using the t-statistic is to check if the p-value is below the chosen significance level, 
and, if so, then the null hypothesis is rejected. In the regression results above, the p-
value for each explanatory variable is an extremely small number, so we can safely 
reject the null hypothesis that these variables are unrelated to bilateral trade. Moreover, 
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Table 5: Regression Results from Gravity Model Estimation with Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion 
 
 
Linear regression                                                  
Number of obs 
F(382,259734) 
Prob > F   
R-squared  
Root MSE               
=  260119 
=  2261.09 
=  0.0000 
=  0.7312 
=  2.0941 
  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  t  P>| t |  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  .8463466     .0260789      32.45     0.000  .7952326      .8974605 
  .3625608     .0233251      15.54     0.000       .3168443      .4082774 
  -1.69801      .006006    --282.72     0.000      -1.709781     -1.686238 
  -.3190286       .08031      -3.97     0.000      -.476434     -.1616232 
  .2274481     .0531532       .28     0.000      .1232693      .3316269 
 
 
Table 5 shows Stata output from having estimated the gravity model as formulated in 
equation (5). This estimation differs from the previous one in that variables for AFTA 
trade creation and diversion are included. The results for GDP and distance are almost 
the  same  as  from  the  previous  estimation.  However,  the  estimated  coefficients  on 
TradeCreate  and  TradeDivert  are  negative  and  positive,  respectively,  which  is  the 
opposite  of  what  was  expected.  Their  signs  and  statistical  significance  suggest  that 
AFTA  actually  reduced  intra-regional  trade  and  increased  extra-regional  trade.  The 
percentage  reduction  in  intra-regional  trade  can  be  computed  as  % 27 1
319 . 0   
 e , 
while the percentage increase in extra-regional trade is  % 26 1
2275 . 0   e .
20 Although the 
proportions of changes in intra- and extra-regional trade are estimated to be about the 
same,  extra-regional  trade  of  ASEAN  countries  was  about  four  times  that  of  intra-
regional trade during the period, suggesting that the net effect of AFTA was an absolute 
rise in trade. Nevertheless, the strange results for trade creation and diversion suggest 
either that preferential AFTA tariffs were ineffective or there were specification problems 
in the model such as omitted variables.
21     
 
To  investigate  if  AFTA  had  a  different  effect  on  newer  ASEAN  members,  we  run  a 
regression with separate trade creation and diversion indicator variables for two groups: 
(i) the original six members (Orig6TradeC and OrigTradeDivert) and (ii) newer members 
(CLVTradeC and CLVTradeD).
22 The results are shown in Table 6 below. 
 
                                                  
20  This formula is used to interpret the coefficient on an explanatory variable when the variable is an 
indicator (or dummy) variable and the dependent variable is in logarithmic form. 
21  Possible specification problems include the omission of variables to capture the trade effects of the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis or cross-country FDI and platform production in East Asia.  
22  The  group  of  newer  members  includes  Cambodia,  Lao  PDR,  and  Viet  Nam.  As  trade  data  for 
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Table 6: Regression Results from Gravity Model Estimation with Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion—Original Six ASEAN Members and Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Viet Nam (CLV) 
 
Linear regression                                                  
Number of obs 
F(382,259734) 
Prob > F   
R-squared  
Root MSE               
=  260119 
=  2252.18 
=  0.0000 
=  0.7313 
=  2.0939 
  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  t  P>| t |  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  .845397  .0260671      32.43     0.000       .7943063  .8964878 
  .3632986  .0233275  15.57  0.000       .3175774  .4090198 
  -1.698416  .0060065  -282.76  0.000       -1.710188  -1.686643 
Orig6TradeC  -.7267084  .0986292  -7.37  0.000       -.920019  -.5333978 
Orig6TradeD  .0406138  .0672881  0.60  0.546  -.0912691      .1724967 
CLVTradeC  .6353428  .118895  5.34  0.000  .4023118      .8683738 
CLVTradeD  .585979  .0803296  7.29  0.000       .4285351      .7434229 
 
 
Again, the results for GDP and distance are almost the same as in previous estimations. 
However,  by  breaking  down  the  trade  creation  and  diversion  variables  by  groups  of 
ASEAN countries, we can see that AFTA affected these groups differently. The original 
six members experienced a reduction of 52% ( 1
7267 . 0 
 e ) in intra-regional trade, while 
extra-regional  trade  did  not  change  significantly.
23  Interestingly,  the  intra-  and  extra-
regional trade of newer ASEAN members rose by 89% ( 1
6353 . 0  e ) and 80% ( 1
586 . 0  e ), 
respectively as a result of AFTA.  To gain some perspective on these numbers, consider 
the case of Cambodian imports. In the third year after becoming an ASEAN member and 
participating in AFTA (2002), the country‘s intra-regional imports were US$598 million 
and extra-regional imports were US$1,067 million. The estimates above suggest that 
without  AFTA  Cambodia  would  have  imported  only  US$316  million  (US$598 
million/1.89) from other ASEAN countries and US$593 million (US$1,067 million/1.80) 
from countries outside the region. In other words, Cambodia experienced an increase in 
trade in that third year of close to US$1 billion due to AFTA.  
 
4.3   Strengths and Limitations of the Gravity Model  
 
The gravity model is used as a workhorse for analyzing trade because data for it is 
widely  available,  the  model  has  high  explanatory  power,  and  there  are  established 
standard practices that facilitate the work of researchers. Its main strengths in evaluating 
an  FTA  are  that  it  allows  the  analyst  to  control  for  other  trade-related  variables  and 
quantify any changes in a country‘s trade due to the FTA. These quantitative estimates 
may then be used in welfare calculations. However, the model  may yield misleading 
                                                  
23  Although  the  sign  on  Orig6TradeD  is  positive,  which  would  indicate  that  the  original  ASEAN  six 
experienced a rise in extra-regional imports, the result is not statistically significant because of the 
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results if the data is inaccurate or important variables are omitted from the estimation. 
Further,  although  the  method  of  estimating  the  gravity  model  presented  above 
addresses most of the basic data and specification issues that arise in implementation, 
other more complicated problems exist. The analyst should refer to the recent literature 




5.  Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper has presented ex post economic evaluation methods for policymakers to get 
a better understanding of how an already-established FTA actually affects trade and 
welfare. In particular, these methods show how to (i) compute the official versus effective 
utilization rate of preferences and the value of preferences, (ii) qualitatively assess trade 
creation  and  diversion,  (iii)  quantitatively  analyze  the  FTA‘s  trade  effects  with  trade 
indicators  and  the  gravity  model,  and  (iv)  make  inferences  about  economic  welfare. 
Evaluating the true versus expected economic impact of an FTA is an important part of 
the monitoring and surveying process that should follow the establishment of an FTA. By 
noting any discrepancies between the FTA‘s actual and predicted effects, policymakers 
can improve their ex ante assessment methods as well as adjust domestic policies and 
international positions in ongoing FTA negotiations accordingly.   
                                                 
24  The other problems are, for example, the presence of zero bilateral trade values (Martin and Cong 
2008), the bias of ordinary least squares when there is heteroskedasticity in a log-linearized model 
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